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The Evolving Concept of European Labor
Relations Legislation
Walter Kolvenbach*
The subject of worker particpation in the decision-making process has
become one of the major topics in the developing area of EEC labor law.
The EEC Treaty, however, does not provide the direct legal basis for the
introduction of worker participation legislation by the Community. The
Commission, therefore, has concentrated on harmonizing the company legis-
lation of the Member States in its drive to develop a European labor legisla-
tion. In this article, Dr. Kolvenbach surveys the existing company legislation
in the Member States dealing with worker participation and discusses the
recent harmonization proposals of the Commission. He then concludes by
supporting the harmonization efforts as the most practical means of achiev-
ing the goal of a European labor law.
INTRODUCTION
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
(EEC)1 refers in its Title III to "Social Policy."2 This title contains
some general statements regarding the social policy of the Community
and assigns to the Commission the task to promote close cooperation
between Member States in the social field. In the field of labor rela-
tions and social policy, the activities of the authorities of the EEC have
not been as extensive as in other fields. However, the EEC has initiated
* General Counsel, Henkel KGaA, DUsseldorf, Federal Republic of Germany; Dr. Jur., Uni-
versity of Cologne, 1949; member of the German Bar since 1952. For a more detailed treatment
of the subject of employee representation in companies within the EEC, see W. KOLVENBACH,
EMPLOYEE CoUNCILs IN EUROPEAN CoMPANIEs (1978) and W. KOLVENBACH, WORKERS PARTIC-
IPATION N EuRoPE (1977).
1 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. II
(entered in force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2 Id. at art. 118.
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discussion of various subjects in this field among the Member States,
especially worker participation in the decision-making process. Over
the years this subject has become one of the major topics in the
developing field of EEC labor law.
Currently, some of the directives pending before the Council of
Ministers address the question of worker participation in decision-mak-
ing processes either at the shop level or at the board level. This raises
the question of whether the European Authorities have responded to a
widespread movement in Europe or whether its activity has prompted
this development in the Member States. It appears that the EEC is
following a trend which began long before its establishment.
The economic, social and legal traditions of the Member States
differ widely, so that completely different structures for industrial deci-
sion-making have developed in the Member States. This conflicts with
the objective of the Community creating a Common Market with a sin-
gle industrial base. Therefore, the harmonization of legislation is in-
tended to abolish obstacles for the free flow of goods and to create the
same competitive environment in all Member States. To achieve this
goal the Commission has emphasized the harmonization of company
laws of the Member States.
The legal authority for harmonization of company legislation is
Article 100 and Article 101 of the Treaty of Rome, which deal with
differences between regulations in Member States that distort the con-
ditions of competition. The EEC authorities do not create binding la-
bor relations legislation, but rather issue directives to the Member
States which they must implement into national law within certain time
periods. This procedure functions quietly but very effectively. The
evolution of an integrated European labor law is, therefore, a slow de-
velopment. Consequently, it will take centuries to harmonize labor law
and labor relations law in the Member States.
An important regulation concerning labor within the Common
Market is Article 49 of the Treaty of Rome which asks for "freedom of
movement for workers" within the Member States. To implement this
article the Council has issued directives dealing with details of free
movement of workers.' On January 21, 1974 the Council passed a res-
olution on a social action program. 4 This program includes high prior-
ity steps to be taken to achieve equality between men and women
regarding access to employment, full and better employment in the
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 of Oct. 15, 1968, 11 J.O. CoMM. EUR. (No. L 257) 2
(1968).
4 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 13) 1 (1974) and 4 BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 2/74 (1974).1
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Community, vocational training and promotion and working condi-
tions, including pay. As one consequence of this program the Council
has adopted Directive 75/117/EEC which deals with the approxima-
tion of the laws of the Member States regarding equal pay for men and
women.5 A further step was Council Directive 76/207/EEC dealing
with the principle of equal treatment as regards access to employment,
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions.6 These di-
rectives and others dealing with details of the questions mentioned im-
plement the various articles of the Treaty guaranteeing to the
employees certain "individual rights." The Member States are com-
pelled to change their labor legislation accordingly. Thus an important
step has been made to equalize individual rights of employees.
WORKERS PARTICIPATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EEC
In Articles 8 and 9, the EEC social action program calls for greater
involvement of management and labor in the economic and social deci-
sions of the Community, and of workers in the life of undertakings.
The Commission of the EEC, therefore, has presented a number of
proposals for the harmonization of existing legislation in the field of
industrial democracy. These activities, though, must be evaluated
against the legislative background existing within the Member States.
Legislative action regarding the establishment of works councils, the
extension of their rights and duties, and the participation of employees
in the decision-making process in companies has increased. Even in
countries like the United Kingdom, where no legislation exists, discus-
sions center around this highly political and emotional issue. It is,
therefore, necessary to look briefly at the situation existing in the Mem-
ber States before considering the steps proposed by the Commission.
This is not the place to describe extensively the sociological back-
ground and history of industrial democracy in Europe, but one should
note that this development has a long history in most European coun-
tries and that, already during the last century, particularly in Germany,
the ideas of the establishment of works councils and the participation
of labor in shop decisions were discussed.7 Co-determination, co-ges-
tion and similar terms falling under the heading of "industrial democ-
racy"' became important parts of the sociological and political
5 18 O3. EuR. Comm. (No. L 45) 19 (1975).
6 19 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40 (1976).
7 For a discussion of the historical development in Germany, see J. TEUTEBERG, GES-
CHICHTE DER INDUSTRIELLEN MITBESTIMMUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND (1961).
8 Sidney and Beatrice Webb completed INDUSTR AL DEMocRAcY in 1897. In the preface to
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discussions of Central Europe. Finally, supra-national organizations
have considered these problems and still exhibit a strong interest in
their development.
The International Labor Office in Geneva advises employers and
workers to promote consultation and cooperation at the level of the
undertaking "on matters of mutual concern not within the scope of col-
lective bargaining machinery."9 The Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development has occupied itself repeatedly in interna-
tional seminars and publications with worker participation.'
WORKERS PARTICIPATION AT THE SHOP FLOOR LEVEL
Works councils or similar institutions, which exist in almost all
Member States of the European Community, influence the decision-
making process at the shop floor level.
Belgium
The conseil d'entreprise (Ondernemingsraad) typically exists in all
enterprises which employ more than 150 employees. Its members are
appointed representatives of management and elected employees. Em-
ployer and conseil d'entreprise have to consult in certain matters; deci-
sion-making participation is limited to matters immediately affecting
the employee. A Royal Decree" has extended considerably the infor-
mation rights of the conseil d'entreprise.
Denmark
The Danish Employers Conference and the Danish Trade Unions
have concluded an agreement providing for the establishment of "co-
operation committees" in the enterprise. These cooperation commit-
tees have as members representatives of management, of the technical
and commercial staff not organized in trade unions and elected repre-
sentatives of the remaining employees. The Committee serves several
this book, the authors state that they attempt to give a scientific analysis of Trade Unionism in the
United Kingdom and that "a large portion of the book was given in the form of lectures at the
London School of Economics and Political Science during 1896 and 1897." They consider it to be
an "imperative lesson that political democracy will inevitably result in industrial democracy." S.
WEBB & B. WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMocRAcY 842 (4th Impression, 1902).
9 Recommendation No. 94, 35th Session, Geneva, June 1952 (published as Annex I to La-
bour-Management Relations Series No. 13).
10 The latest of such seminars was held in 1975 in Versailles and the proceedings have been
published by the OECD 1976 under the title "Workers' Participation."
11 4rr&tb royalportant rlglementation des inforration _conomiques elftnancieres lifournir aux
conseils d'entreprises, Nov. 27, 1973, MONITEUR BELGE Nov. 28, 1973, at 13,359.
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functions. First, it keeps the employees informed about its work. Sec-
ond, it influences the general policy of day-to-day production and work
planning and the implementation of major alterations in the enterprise.
Third, it receives information from management on the economic situ-
ation and the future prospects of the enterprise.12
Federal Refpublic of Germany
The Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) of 1972
extended the rights and duties of works councils.1 3 It is the most ad-
vanced regulation in this field within the Common Market. Members
of the works council are elected by all employees of the enterprise re-
gardless of membership in a trade union. The council has important
co-determination rights especially for decisions affecting the individual
employee. Employment, job transfer and firing decisions require the
consent of the works council, along with decisions affecting working
conditions, method of payment of wages, industrial security, and other
employee-related decisions.
France
As early as 1945 and 1946, France passed regulations creating
comit entreprise for all industrial and commercial enterprises employ-
ing more than fifty employees.' 4 Members include the manager or his
representative and the elected delegates of the personnel. Management
must inform the comit entreprise of production programs, general de-
velopments of the business, and the employment situation, transforma-
tion of equipment, purchases of new equipment, new production
methods and facilities and all questions regarding working conditions.
It must be consulted on personnel reductions, including planned dis-
missals for economic reasons.
Ireland
Neither legislation nor nationwide agreements require the estab-
lishment of works councils but there exist some works councils in Irish
firms that are regarded as tests for general introduction of a works
council system. The shop stewards play an important role as represent-
atives of the trade unions in the factories. They deal primarily with
grievances of the workers and negotiate or consult with management.
12 For an English translation of this agreement and existing legislation, see W. KOLVENBACH,
EMPLOYEE COUNCILS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIS 103 (1978).
13 1972 BGB1 13 (W. Ger.).
14 C. TRAv., Tome 1 (1975).
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Italy
No legislation or nationwide agreements exist in Italy as well.
Some of the usual rights and duties of works councils are handled by
Commissione Interna which exist in companies with forty or more em-
ployees. The Commissione submits proposals for production increase
or improvements of working methods to management. It supervises the
correct application of labor agreements and observes safety and hy-
gienic regulations regarding social facilities.
Luxembourg
Comitks Mixtes have existed in Luxembourg since 1974.15 Mem-
bership consists of an equal number of representatives of the employer
and the employees. Employee representatives are elected. The em-
ployer must inform and consult the committee before making impor-
tant decisions concerning technical equipment for production and
administration of working methods and production processes. The
managing director also must inform and consult on the requirements
and development of personnel, methods of training for the work force,
economic and financial decisions which might have a major influence
on the structure of the company or its level of employment.
The Netherlands
This country has a long history of works council legislation. The
first works council act was passed on May 4, 1950. A completely re-
vised act has been in. effect since July 5, 1979.16 The new legislation
extends the field of application to a greater number of companies.
Only elected representatives of the work force serve on the works coun-
cils. Its rights have also been extended. The council must be kept in-
formed of all important company matters, future plans and projections,
financial statements and capital investment plans. The company must
seek its advice on all major policy questions of the company, of course,
including sale, merger, closing down or extensive lay-offs of personnel.
In a number of important areas management needs the approval of the
works council before it can take certain steps including changes of the
remuneration systems, retirement plans, work or vacation time, hiring
and firing, promotion policy and similar matters related to personnel
decisions.
15 Loi du 6 Mai 1974 institutant des Comitks mixtes dans les entreprises du secteurprin et or-
ganisant la reprksentation des salaries dans les societfs anonymes, reprinted in MEMORIAL JOURNAL
OFFICIEL Du GRAND-DUCHI DE LUXEMBOURG 620 (A. No. 35).
16 1979 Stb. 448.
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United Kingdom
There exists no legislation or nationwide collective bargaining
agreement on works councils, even though some companies have works
councils by separate agreements. The British Trade Union Movement
relies upon its shop stewards in the factory who are of considerable
importance for the industrial relations climate. Their work covers two
areas, namely solving grievances for members of the trade union and,
therefore, negotiating with management and acting as representative of
the trade union members, including providing representation of the
trade union in the workshop, recruiting new members and collecting
union membership dues.
Works council institutions on the one hand, and collective bar-
gaining instruments on the other hand, co-exist in most member coun-
tries of the EEC. The underlying general principle of the works
councils is to solve conflict situations or, even better, to avoid such situ-
ations. It is necessary to emphasize this because in some countries
trade unions believe in opposition to management and only if one un-
derstands the different environment of European labor relations can
one see the reason for the existence of works councils or equivalent
institutions.
WORKER PARTICIPATION AT THE BOARD LEVEL
The next "hierarchical" step in the development of workers partic-
ipative institutions was the participation of employees in the decision-
making process at the board level through employee-appointed or
elected directors. Legislation of several Member States of the EEC re-
quires that decision-making bodies of companies include elected or ap-
pointed representatives of the workers. This new development not only
influences the economic and managerial decision-making rprocess but
also the legal status of the board of directors or its equivalent in the
Member States. Traditionally, the shareholders or their representatives
elected or appointed the members of the board or supervisory organ of
a stock corporation. Under the new system, the shareholders have lost
part of this right since the new system transfers the election or ap-
pointing rights to the work force. Corporation law has changed as a
result. The company is no longer a purely capitalistic organization but
a combination of capital and work force. Management must consider
the interest of the work force as an important element of public interest
and corporate social responsibility. 17 This new concept presents a
17 Schmitthoff, SocialResponsibility in European Company Law, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1419, 1421
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strong challenge for management and changes completely the existing
structures and its work. 18 The system not only changes the managerial
process but also raises complicated legal issues. Some European com-
pany legislation has the "two-tier-system" consisting of a management
board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board supervises the
management board, which is the executive body of the company and is
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the company. It also ap-
points the members of the management board and no person may be a
member in both institutions at the same time. The "one-tier-system"
combines management and supervision in one organ. The presence of
employee-elected members in a unitarian organ creates legal questions
regarding the individual responsibility of board members and their lia-
bility to the shareholders of the company. 9 The status of employee
representatives on boards in the Member States is as follows:
Belgium
There exists no representation of workers on the board of directors
in the private sector, but the public sector has some examples of em-
ployee representation appointed by the minister in charge of the rail-
road or other transportation organizations.
Denmark
Two laws dating from 1973 gave the workers of all companies em-
ploying at least fifty persons the right to elect two members to the board
of directors, in addition to those elected by the shareholders.20 New
legislation extended employee membership on the board to one-third
of the total members.2 The employee-elected members possess the
same rights and obligations as the other members. Since they must
protect the interests of the company, a strict secrecy obligation prevents
(1979); Roth & Fitz, Corporate Social Responsibility: European Models, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1433,
1437 (1979).
18 The new management concept enforced by the membership of employee representatives in
supervisory boards has also been commented upon outside the legal community. See e.g., Ball,
The Hard Hats in Europe's Board Rooms, FORTUNE, June 1976, at 180; Orr, On Employee Repre-
sentation and Cooperation, 55 HARV. Bus. REV. 36 (Jan.-Feb. 1977); J. FURLONG, LABOR IN THE
BOARDROOM, THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION (1977).
19 For a discussion of the two systems, see Schoenbaum & Lieser, Reform ofthe Structure of
the American Corporation: The "Two-Tier"BoardModel, 62 Ky. L.J. 91 (1973) and Roth, Supervi-
sion of Corporate Management: The "Outside Director" and the German Experience, 51 N.C.L.
REv. 1369 (1973).
20 Al No. 370; ApsL No. 371 (for companies with limited liability).
21 On June 16, 1980, Laws No. 266 and No. 267 extended employee membership in Danish
boards.
European Labor Relations Legislation
3:535(1981)
the employee members to give their colleagues information about the
work of the board. The employee representatives may not attend delib-
erations and decisions on labor conflicts, or concerning the relationship
of the company with trade unions or manufacturers associations.
Federal Republic of Germany
Germany has three different laws regulating the membership of
employee representatives on the supervisory board. The first was the
Coal and Steel Act of 1951.22 The Works Constitution Act of 1952
gives one-third of the membership in the supervisory board in compa-
nies with more than five hundred but less than two thousand employees
to the representatives of the work force.23 The Co-Determination Act
of 1976 gives one-half of the seats of the supervisory boards in compa-
nies with more than two thousand employees to the representatives of
the work force. 4 For the employee members of the supervisory board
the law differentiates between three categories: employees working in
the company, representatives of trade unions, including officials of all
trade unions who are active in the company, and representatives of se-
nior employees or management personnel (Leitende Angestellte). De-
pendent upon the size of the supervisory board these groups are
represented according to specific rules in the Act. Since the law re-
quires an even number of members of the supervisory board (12, 16 or
20), an equal vote would result in a deadlock. To prevent this the Co-
Determination Act provides that in such a case in a second poll the
chairman has a double or tie-breaking vote. Thus, the shareholders'
bench has a slight advantage because the chairman of the board is al-
ways a shareholders' representative.
The Federal Republic of Germany utilizes different systems for
each of three categories of companies. All three systems have influ-
enced discussion in the EEC. Under the Coal and Steel Act, sharehold-
ers and employees have the same number of representatives on the
board. In addition, a "neutral man" acts as tie-breaker in case of a tie
vote. In companies with less than two thousand employees, one-third
of the board members is elected by the employees. In companies with
more than two thousand employees there is again an equal number of
22 1951 BGB1 at 347 (with amendments).
23 1972 BGBI at 13.
24 1976 BGB1 at 1153. For English language commentaries, see Mertens & Schanze, The Ger-
man Codetermination Act of 1976, 2 J. Comp. CoRp. L & SEc. REG. 75 (1979) and Wiedemann,
Codeterminatton by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM. . CoMp. L. 79 (1980). For the survey
in relation to the United States, see Bonnano, Employee Codeterminatiorn Orins in Germany,
Present Practice in Europe and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARv. J. LEGIS. 947 (1977).
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shareholders' representatives and employee representatives. But here,
the chairman as representative of the shareholders, has a double or tie-
breaking vote.
25
Experience with the new co-determination system reveals many
problems because this system has not been incorporated but was "pul-
led" over the existing company legislation drafted under completely
different circumstances.2 6
France
Worker participation is referred to in the preamble to the French
Constitution. Legislation in 1945 provided for a limited form of co-
gestion for French companies employing fifty persons or more.27 In
these companies, two delegates of the works council are permitted to
participate with consultative status in meetings of the conseil
d'administration. Executive and supervisory staff constitute a special
group entitled to appoint delegates to the meetings.
Ireland
The Workers Participation Act of 1977 regulates worker participa-
tion in Ireland.2" One-third of the members of boards of state-owned
enterprises listed in the Act will be elected by and from the work force.
The employees thus elected are appointed as directors of the board by
the minister concerned. They have the same rights and duties as the
other directors and receive the same fees and allowances. These
worker directors share with the other directors general responsibility
for the overall objectives of the enterprise and the government policy
for the particular sector. To avoid a conffict of interest, the elected di-
rectors are not permitted to participate or assist in collective bargain-
ing. When passing the Act, it was stressed that the elected directors
would be appointed within the existing single tier board structure. The
Act is considered a first step in employees' representation at the man-
agement level which will be followed by further steps following an
evaluation of the experience.29
25 Mooney, A Delicate Balance: Equal Representationfor Labor on German Corporate Boards,
16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 352 (1975).
26 For a survey of difficulties encountered so far, see Kolvenbach, Co-Determination in Ger-
many, History and Practical Experiences, 9 (iv) INT'L Bus. LAW. 163 (Apr. 1981).
27 [1945] J.O. 954.
28 No. 6 of 1977 (Wt.-800.5/77. CahiU. (7317).G.16).
29 This statement was repeated by the Irish Government in its White Paper NATIONAL DEVEL-
OPMENT 1977-1980 (Gov. Pub. PrI. 6836).
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Italy
Workers' representation on the board of companies in the private
sector is not known in Italy.
Luxembourg
For all companies employing at least one thousand persons, legis-
lation30 provides that the conseil d'administration shall have a mini-
mum of nine members, one-third of which must be representatives of
the employees. The employee representatives are not elected directly
but through the dblkgation ouvriere. In the iron and steel industry,
three of the employee representatives can be appointed by the trade
unions. The law states expressly that those members of the board who
are appointed by the employees are responsible for faults during their
membership on the board as are all other board members.
The Netherlands
Holland has developed a most interesting system because appoint-
ment and removal of members of the supervisory board is no longer a
privilege of the shareholders' meeting, but rather is a privilege of the
supervisory board itself. This system is unique in Europe and conse-
quently has generated great interest because it has made co-determina-
tion effective without direct workers representation in the board of
Dutch companies. Its purpose is to avoid one-sided influence on the
board by vested interests. It assumes that the supervisory board is a
team which must consider the interests of capital and labor. It must
assist management and assume co-responsibility on general company
policy. The supervisory board itself nominates candidates for co-opta-
tion. Also, at the shareholders' meeting, the works council and man-
agement may make recommendations for appointment but the board is
not bound by these recommendations. On the other hand, the share-
holders' meeting and the works council may object to persons nomi-
nated by the board for co-optation. The Social Economic Council,
which deals nationwide with objections, solves deadlocks and encour-
ages coordination and cooperation on the board. The system creates
the necessity of permanent discussion between labor, shareholders and
management on matters of company policy. Co-optation ensures that
all board members have the full confidence of both shareholders and
employees. The work of the board is to be guided only by the interests
30 See note 15 supra.
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of the company and its business.31
United Kingdom
Britain has no legislation governing membership of employees on
its board of directors, but discussions on this subject have taken place
during the last few years. Political debate became especially heavy fol-
lowing publication of the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on In-
dustrial Democracy (Bullock Report).32 This discussion was strongly
influenced by proposals of the EEC and it has been charged repeatedly
that the EEC forces Britain to accept systems which are outside of its
legal tradition.33
PARTICIPATION THROUGH OWNERSHIP IN THE COMPANY: ASSET
FORMATION OR PROFIT-SHARING?
The Commission has published a memorandum on the subject of
participation through ownership in the company which surveys the leg-
islation and systems existing in the Member States.3a Harmonization
of these systems is extremely difficult and will necessitate considerable
changes, especially in the tax legislation of the Member States. There-
fore, it is unlikely that the Commission will introduce proposals in this
field for some time.
HARMONIZATION PROPOSALS OF THE EEC
The activities of the Commission to harmonize labor legislation
must be viewed against this background of participative institutions ex-
isting in the nine Member States. The existing systems have influenced
harmonization proposals because in the Council all Member States
must reach agreement. They are unwilling to change extensively ex-
isting legislation which entails compromise between the political forces,
management and the trade unions. Material changes imposed by Eu-
ropean legislation would, in most Member States, provoke heated con-
troversy. Therefore, the Commission proposals seek to combine
31 B.w. at art. 158.
32 Her Majesty's Stationary Office (HMSO), Cmnd. 6706 (1977). For a review of the British
trade union situation and the work of the committee, see J. ELLIOT, CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?
THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1978).
33 Schmitthoff, Company Structure and Employee Participation in the EEC-he British Atti-
tude, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 611 (1976). For the present status of the discussions in Britain, see
Kolvenbach, Industrial Democracy. Legal Developments in Europe 1977-1979, 1 N.Y.J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 77, 122 (1980).
34 Employee Particpation in Asset Formation, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
COM (79) 190 Final (Aug. 29, 1979).
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elements of existing systems from which Member States would have
the option to choose between the various systems.
The Commission has chosen two methods for the introduction of
employee participation in the corporate decision-making process. One
such method is revealed in the discussion concerning a statute for Eu-
ropean companies, which proposes a company especially designed for
transnational activities and inter-Member State commerce. The other
method involves the harmonization of existing company legislation in
the Member States. To non-European lawyers, it may appear strange
that labor legislation is considered in connection with company legisla-
tion, but in most European countries, the workers participate in deci-
sion-making processes within the company structure, through the
supervisory board or the board of directors. Worker involvement has
led to changes in company legislation and integrated some areas of
company and labor law. Experience in Germany and other countries
with strong co-determination legislation, shows that company law
gradually becomes more important than the relevant labor law regula-
tion. It is, therefore, logical that the Commission is attempting to influ-
ence the national co-determination scenery through harmonization of
company laws on the one hand and the creation of a transnational
company law on the other.
Statute for the European Company
In 1958, the Commission asked Professor G6rard Lyon-Can in
Paris to study and des6ribe possibilities for the representation of em-
ployees' interests in the European company. With expert assistance,
Professor Lyon-Can developed proposals which are included in the
statutory draft for the European company.35 He suggested that a con-
tractual agreement be made between the new European company, its
employees and the trade unions. This collective agreement would reg-
ulate co-determination in the company. Even though this method is
flexible, the study acknowledged that trade unions in Germany, for ex-
ample, would be reluctant to accept less co-determination than already
existing by German law. The original statutory proposal3 6 was part of
an effort to create centralized incorporation facilities for companies
wishing to be active in all member countries and to strengthen inter-
35 The study has been published in German and French by the Commission of the European
Communities in REIHE WETTBEWERB-REcHTANGLICHUNG-1970- 10 with the (German) title Be!-
trag zu den Mdglichkeiten der Vertretung der Interessen der Arbeitnehmer in der Europaiischen Ak-
liengesellschaft. The French title is Contribution a I"btude des modes de rear~sentation des intbrats
des travailleurs dans le cadre des sociut~s anonymes europeMnnes.
36 13 J.O. Comm. Eum. (No. C 124) 1 (1970); 3 BuLL. Eu. Comm., Supp. 8/70 (1970).
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company co-operation across borders. The French took the initiative
to put this matter on the agenda of the Common Market authorities.37
The deliberations in the European Parliament revealed an ideological
schism regarding employee co-determination through board member-
ship. On July 10, 1974, the European Parliament voted for a kind of
German Coal and Steel Model.3 8 One-third of the board would be
comprised of representatives of shareholders and workers, respectively.
Both groups would agree on the last third, which would consist of rep-
resentatives of the "general interest." These representatives cannot be
dependent on interests of shareholders or workers.
As a result of the debates in the European Parliament and the Eco-
nomic and Social Commitee, these proposals were altered by the Com-
mission. Additional adjustments became necessary by the accession of
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to the EEC. A new propo-
sal was published and ultimately presented by the Commission to the
Council on May 13, 1975.19
In Title V, the proposal deals with the representation of employees
in the European company. Representation occurs through works coun-
cils and membership of employees on the supervisory board of the Eu-
ropean company, both of which are described below.
European Works Councils
A European works council must be formed in the European com-
pany if it has at least two establishments in different Member States,
each one having a minimum of fifty employees. Since employees' rep-
resentation existing under national law will continue, the European
company will have concurrent national and European work councils.
The members of the European works council are elected by the em-
ployees of all establishments of the company within the EEC. Annex II
of the proposal contains elaborate election rules. During their term of
office, the members of the European works council are dispensed from
the obligation of carrying out the duties of their employment. This re-
lease is valid only to the extent to which the European works council
considers it necessary for the performance of a representative's duty,
which includes the representation of the interests of the employees.
Members are pledged to confidentiality. The secrecy obligation applies
37 For the history, see Kohler, The New Corporation Laws in Germany (1966) and France
(1967) and the Trend Towards a Uniform Corporation Lawfor the Common Market, 43 TUL. L.
REv. 58, 81 (1968).
38 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 93) 22 (1974).
39 8 BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 4/75 (1975).
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to information expressly declared confidential by the management
board. The works council regularly informs its constituency of its non-
confidential work. Its competence covers all matters which concern
more than one establishment which is not located in the same Member
State and which cannot be settled by national employees' representa-
tive bodies. Thus, the works council deals primarily with transnational
problems arising out of the existence of a transnational company with a
transnational work force. Its competence does not include collective
bargaining agreements.
The information rights of the European works council would be
similar to the rights which already exist in some Member States. The
same 6ommunications and documents which are given to the share-
holders also have to be submitted to the works council, including par-
ticular annual accounts, annual reports, consolidated or part-
consolidated accounts and consolidated annual reports. Written infor-
mation on any matter which, in the opinion of the works council, af-
fects the fundamental interests of the European company or its
employees, must also be submitted.
The board of management has to consult with the European works
council in certain matters. In addition, the works council participates
extensively in the decision-making process. This includes practically
all matters regarding the work of the employees, compensation and
work time. But, training, industrial safety and management of social
facilities also require the agreement of the European works council.
Employee Board Membersho
The proposal also provides for employee representation on the su-
pervisory board. By a majority vote, the employees of the European
company can waive their representation right on the board. The repre-
sentatives are to be elected by all employees and have the same rights
and duties as the other members of the supervisory board. Out of three
employee representatives, one may be a person who is not in the em-
ployment of the European company, i.e., an outside trade union offi-
cial. If there are more than three employee representatives, two
employee representatives on the board may be from outside the com-
pany. Annex HI regulates in detail the election procedure. To facili-
tate the election in companies with more than one establishment,
delegates charged with voting on the employee representatives are
elected in the various establishments of the European company.4°
40 The German Co-Determination Act of 1976 also provides for an electorate system for com-
panies'with a certain number of employees. During parliamentary procedure, this system has
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According to Article 74 of the Statute of the European Companies,
the supervisory board shall consist of one-third representatives from
the shareholders, one-third representatives from the employees and
one-third of members co-opted by these two groups. Candidates for
co-optation may be nominated by the general meeting, the employees'
representatives body or the board of management. Only persons repre-
senting general interest, possessing the necessary knowledge and expe-
rience, and not directly dependent on the shareholders, the employees
or their representive organizations may be nominated. For election,
two-thirds of the votes within the supervisory board are required.4'
Regardless whether legislation for a European company will in the fu-
ture be enacted, the Commission has shown in its drafts how employ-
ees' representative institutions can be included in company law. This
has had, and will have in the future, an important influence on the
national legislation of the Member States. However, the draft statute is
not yet ready for enactment and it is uncertain when the Council will
decide on the proposals.
The F#ffh Directive
In its program to harmonize the company laws in the member
states, the Commission published the
Proposal for a fifth directive to coordinate the safeguards which, for the
protection of the interests of members and the others, are required by
Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph
of article 58 of the Treaty, as regards the structure of Socit&ts Anonymes
and the powers and obligations of their organs.4 2
In essence, this directive, if adopted by the Council of Ministers,
would make the two-tier system (i.e., supervisory board and manage-
ment board) compulsory for the company structure. This is of special
importance for countries with the traditional single board of directors.
The directive would also give workers the right to elect members to the
supervisory board. This proposed directive is one of a number of direc-
been strongly opposed with the argument that direct election of candidates is more democratic.
But the German trade unions exercised pressure in favor of the electorate system. As a compro-
mise, the German Act opens the possibility to change the system with certain voting majorities.
The European Rules for the election of employees' representatives to the Supervisory Board do
not grant such option to the employees except for European companies with only one
establishment.
41 It is obvious that this system includes elements of the Dutch co-optation model as well as
the German Coal and Steel Act. The so-called "neutral" board member became under the Euro-
pean proposal a "neutral" bench. Elements of this system can aso be found in the Bullock Com-
mittee's proposal.
42 5 BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 10/72 (1972).
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tives in this field which either are already in effect or are still in the
proposal stage. Their aim is to harmonize company law in the member
states. The directive not only deals with worker participation in super-
visory boards, but it would change fundamentally the structure of the
company in some Member States. The question of whether to have
one-tier or two-tier boards is a controversial aspect of the proposal.
The original draft of the Commission postulates three company organs,
namely, management, a supervisory organization and the shareholders.
Management was to be appointed and dismissed by the supervisory
board. In companies with more than five hundred employees, either
one-third of the supervisory organ was to be appointed by the workers
or the 'supervisory organ can itself co-opt new members. Furthermore,
the draft contained provisions regarding the rights and duties of the
supervisory organ and obligated the board of management to obtain
the approval of the supervisory board for certain management
decisions."
The public and parliamentary discussions surrounding the draft
Fifth Directive induced the Commission to issue its so-called "Green
Paper"' on employee participation and company structure in the EEC.
This paper discusses the principal positions and trends in the EEC re-
garding company structure. Its aim was to support and explain the
proposed Fifth Directive and "to give a new impetus to the debate
amongst all interested parties on the decision-making structure of in-
dustrial and commercial firms."45
In the "Green Paper," the Commission maintained that the dual
board system is the desirable system and remains one of the objectives
of the Commission. It proposed a transitional period to permit Mem-
ber States to adjust to this structure. The Commission argued that em-
ployee representation on the supervisory board has a valuable role to
play in the Community because it enables employees to influence the
decision-making process of the company. In view of the objections
raised against the proposal, the Commission indicated that uniform
rules for employees' representation on boards probably are not appro-
priate but that certain general provisions should ensure that all systems,
43 For a review of the original draft, see Conlon, Industrial Democracy and EEC Company
Law: .4 Review of the Draft Fifth Directive, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 348 (1975). Conlon also
questioned the legality of the draft in Conlon, The Draft 5th Directive-A Question of Legality, 125
NEW. LJ. 39 (1975).
44 8 BuLL. EuR. Comm., Supp. 8/75 (1975) (The term "Green Paper" is borrowed from British
parliamentary procedure).
45 EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIEs, TRADE UNION INFORMATION 2 (1976).
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in effect, guarantee that employees' representatives are truly the elected
representatives of the company's work force.
After publication of the "Green Paper" the Commission was opti-
mistic about the future of the Fifth Directive.4 6 But there is hardly a
parallel to the debates and amendments which the European Parlia-
ment proposed, an experience widespread among the Member States
when national co-determination legislation was proposed. This subject
has ideological, political and emotional aspects which became apparent
again in the parliamentary discussions at Strasburg.
For eight years, the draft was debated and revised in the old ap-
pointed European Parliament and thereafter in the new Parliament fol-
lowing the first European elections in June, 1979. The old Parliament
had hoped to conclude the work on the draft, especially since the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee had reached an opinion on employees'
participation and company structure in the EEC. In this opinion, the
Committee pointed out that workers' participation is favorably viewed
but that the development of participation has not reached the same
stage in all Member States due to different political, historical and ide-
ological backgrounds. Consequently, "the Committee considers that
this is an issue, like many others, on which one must not seek instant
uniformity."'47 The community provisions on participation must be
flexible. The Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament
adopted on April 26, 1979, a report prepared by its rapporteur as in
which it drew the attention of the Council to the close inter-relationship
between the proposal for the Fifth Directive and the statute for a Euro-
pean company. It rejected the co-optation model because it was con-
sidered not to be a genuine form of employees' participation.
One of the most surprising amendments was the newly introduced
concept of a labor director (4rbeitsdirektor).4 9 For the draft Fifth Di-
46 Commissioner Gundelach pointed out on Oct. 1, 1975 in Frankfurt that in the European
Parliament the attitude had changed between 1972 and 1974. Originally there was a number of
motions to delete the co-determination proposals from the agenda, but in 1974 no such move was
made (Mitbestimmung, Wirtschaftsordnung, Grundgesetz: Wissenschaftliche Konferenz des
DGB) (mimeographed).
47 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 94) 2 (1979).
48 [1979-1980] EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 136) (1979).
49 This term is borrowed from the German co-determination legislation. The Coal and Steel
Act demands that the labor director cannot be appointed against the vote of the employee mem-
bers of the board. Under the Co-Determination Act of 1976 the Arbeitsdirektor is an ordinary
member of the management board who can, therefore, be elected also against the vote of the
employee members. The Committee suggests the following wording for Article 3(2): "An em-
ployee director shall be appointed a member of the management organ with the same rights. The
employee director may not be appointed against the votes of a majority of the employees in the
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rective, it proposed a minimum of one-third employee directors on the
supervisory boards of all companies employing more than two hundred
and fifty people.
The draft of the Legal Affairs Committee was awaiting final vote
in plenary session when the first European elections took place in June,
1979. At the session of May 7, 1979, the President of the Parliament
formally announced the receipt of the Legal Affairs Committee's Re-
port.50 A quorum call on May 11, 1979, failed to bring the number of
members required under the rules of procedure and the vote was
placed on the agenda of the next meeting. But at the end of this day,
Parliament adjourned without having voted on the draft.
At the first meeting of the new Parliament's Legal Affairs Commit-
tee on September 4, 1979, British member of Parliament Turner, who
had been elected Vice Chairman of the Committee, initiated a new de-
bate on the directive. The Committee decided to withdraw the direc-
tive from the next plenary session for further consideration. New
proposals were worked out, providing for an option of a two-tier or a
unitary board. If the company opts for a unitary board, workers' par-
ticipation takes place in a separate consultative council elected by all
employees including management. If desired by the employees, each
union or class of employees can vote separately. The consultative
council has to consider proposals of the board on major issues of in-
vestment, redundancy, change of factory site, change in company activ-
ities and profitability. The council is intended as a forum for the
exchange of views which will lead to a genuine consultative process.
The new proposal limits participation to companies with more
than two thousand employees.5" This proposal establishes the voting
and thus participative rights of the individual employee regardless of
whether or not he belongs to a trade union. It attests to the necessary
inclusion in any proposal, acceptable to continental European Member
States, the absolute right of every individual employee whether a union
member or not and whether managerial or not, to vote by secret ballot.
This is contrary to the present situation in the United Kingdom where
trade unions want to limit influence to their members.
This proposal ignited considerable public opposition, especially in
the United Kingdom. The Confederation of British Industry and the
British Institute of Directors informed Members of the British Parlia-
supervisory organ or against the vote of the institution representing the company's employees
50 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 140) 7 (1979).
51 European Parliament, Legal Affairs Committee, PE 62.045 of July 18, 1980.
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ment that they refused to support "the implementation of the directive
if it includes any reference to the statutory enforcement of workers'
representatives on company boards."52 Secret ballot by all employees,
regardless of whether they belong to unions or not, would be
mandatory for the acceptance of any proposal.
THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS IN MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES
The Commission has considered the problem of multinational
companies, specifically whether the EEC can propose control of such
undertakings. The Commission took the view that international orga-
nizations like the United Nations, the Organization of Economic Coop-
eration and Development and the International Labor Office, have no
legal powers to implement their policies in their member countries.
The EEC as a political organization was distinguishable. The EEC has
a system of laws and institutions for adopting, applying and enforcing
such legislation. 3 The Commission sent proposals for nine directives
to the Council, two of which have since been adopted. The two direc-
tives that passed and one of the proposals are discussed below.
Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to the Safeguarding of Employees' Rights in
the Event of Transfer of Undertakings, Businesses
or Parts of Businesses54
This provision substitutes the new employer for the old employer
in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of busi-
nesses. Rights and obligations based on plant agreements or collective
agreements remain applicable until their normal expiration date. The
transfer in itself does not constitute a reason for dismissal of employees.
The transferor and transferee employers are required to inform the rep-
52 Elliot, UK Employers Oppose EEC Proposals on Worker Directors, Financial Times, Aug.
12, 1980, at 3. In July 1980, the Institute of Directors published a paper by A. Hutchinson, The
EEC th Directive, A Trojan Bullock? Lord Bullock, being a famous historian, commented on
this title in a letter to the author: "Evidently their classical learning is not very good, since the
arrival of the Trojan horse was the prelude to the fall of Troy." The progress of the Fifth Direc-
tive through the machinery of the EEC induced the British publication The Director to ask its
Chairman's Panel about the attitude towards employee participation in decision-making. The
answers reported in the December 1980 issue (at 20) show that there is still a considerable lack of
understanding about the workability of participative institutions.
53 Multinational Undertakings and Community Regulations, Commission Communication to
the Council of Nov. 8, 1973, 6 BULL. EUR. COMM., Supp. 15/73 (1973).
54 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of Feb. 14, 1977, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 26 (1977).
For a discussion of Council Directive 77/187, see Bartlett, Employees' Rights in Mergers and
Takeovers-EEC Proposals and the American Approach, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 621 (1976).
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resentatives of their employees affected by the transfer of the reasons,
the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer for the em-
ployees, and the measures envisaged in relation to the employees. Such
information must be provided within a reasonable time before the
transfer is carried out.
Directive on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States
Relating to Collective Redundancies
55
This directive makes it compulsory for the employer to begin con-
sultations with the representatives of the employees whenever collective
redundancies are planned. The employer must discuss the possibility
of avoiding and reducing dismissals, the choice of workers to be dis-
missed, the possibilities of employment elsewhere in the firm, compen-
sation and the priority to be given to the redundant workers for
reemployment after a certain period. The employer must notify public
authorities of any collective redundancies planned with the under-
standing that the redundancies may not be put into effect for a period
of thirty days. This period must be used to seek to avoid or to reduce
the dismissals in question and to ease the consequences.
Proposalfor the Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting
the Employees of Undertakings with Complex Structures, in
Particular Transnational Undertakings
In its communication to the Council on multinationals, the Com-
mission proposed that large national and multinational companies
should provide better information on their activities, especially to their
employees. Surprisingly, in the summer of 1980, the. Commission
worked out a draft directive which was submitted on October 24, 1980
by the Commission to the Council. 6 In its explanatory memorandum
to the proposal, the Commission explained that because of the struc-
tural changes of undertakings, the procedures for consulting and dis-
closing information to employees were inconsistent with those new
structures since their employees continued to be informed and con-
sulted only at local level.
The proposal, therefore, advocates that additional information be
supplied by employers "in each member state relating to their com-
55 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 48) 29 (1975).
56 Proposalfor a Council Directive on Proceduresfor Informing and Consulting the Employees of
Undertakings with Complex Structures, in Particular Transnational Undertakings, COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPE COMMUNITIEs, COM (80) 423 Final, Oct. 24, 1980, 23 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. C
297) 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Commission Proposal].
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pany's transnational operations so that they can provide their employ-
ees with a complete picture of the activities and performance of the
concern as a whole in the various countries in which it is established."57
To complete this information, it is necessary to make provisions which
enable employees' representatives to approach management at the level
of the decision-making centers in another country, i.e., employees are
encouraged to press for international consultations at the headquarters
level. This will result in higher centralization of management in con-
trast to the present management which favors decentralization and will
strengthen the responsibility on local management levels. The Com-
mission believes that a legal structure for the disclosure of information
to and consultation with employees will lead to a uniform operating
environment for all undertakings in the Community. It is claimed that
the Community regulation does not seek to interfere with existing na-
tional systems but endeavors to integrate the procedures existing under
national legislation or on a voluntary basis, into the Community
system.
This proposed directive relates to procedures for informing and
consulting employees who are employed by an undertaking whose de-
cision-making center is either located in another Member State or in a
non-member country. It applies to employees in undertakings with
several establishments or subsidiaries in a single Member State.
This proposal requires the management of the parent company to
disclose certain information every six months via the management of
the subsidiaries to employee representatives in all subsidiaries employ-
ing at least one hundred employees in the EEC. This information in-
cludes: (a) structure and manpower needs; (b) economic and financial
data; (c) the current situation and probable development of the busi-
ness and of production and sales; (d) current employment and probable
trends; (e) production and investment programs; (f) rationalization
plans; (g) manufacturing and working methods, in particular the intro-
duction of new working methods; and (h) all procedures and plans lia-
ble to have a substantial effect on employees' interests.
The management of the subsidiary is required to communicate this
information without delal to the employees' representatives of the sub-
sidiary. If the subsidiary management is unable to do so, it is the duty
of the parent company's management to comply, and such compliance
can be enforced by "appropriate penalties."
if the parent company intends to make a decision concerning the
57 Commission Proposal, supra note 56, at COM (80) 423 Final at 2.
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whole or major part of the dominant undertaking or one of its subsidi-
aries which might have a substantial effect on the interests of the em-
ployees, it is required to forward precise information to the
management of each of its subsidiaries within the EEC not later than
forty days before adopting the decision. This information must include
details of the reasons for the proposed decision; the legal, economic and
social consequences for the employees concerned; and the measures
planned in respect of these employees. This affects all decisions relat-
ing to: (a) closure or transfer of an establishment or major parts
thereof; (b) restrictions, extension or substantial modifications to the
activities of the undertaking; (c) major modifications with regard to or-
ganization; and (d) the introduction of long term cooperation with
other undertakings or the cessation of such cooperation.
The subsidiary management has to communicate this information
to the employees' representatives. Moreover, it must ask for their opin-
ion within a period of not less than thirty days. If the employees' repre-
sentatives are of the opinion that the proposed decision will have an
effect on the employees' term of employment or working conditions,
the management of the subsidiary has to consult with them in order to
reach agreement on the measures planned. If the management does
not inform or consult the employees' representatives, they have the
right to open direct consultation with the management of the parent
company. In order to obtain this information and, if necessary, to
reach agreement on the planned measures, appropriate penalties shall
be provided for by the Member States for non-fulfillment of this
obligation.
Under the definition of Article 2 of the proposed directive, the
term "employees' representatives" means the representatives provided
for by local legislation or practice of the Member States, i.e., primarily
the works councils existing in most Member States. Article 7(3) states
that "[a] body representing all the employees of the dominant under-
taking and its subsidiaries within the Community may be created by
means of agreements to be concluded between the management of the
dominant undertaking and the employees' representatives.""8 This
could result in pressures from trade unions to establish works councils
on an international level for enterprises operating in more than one
Member State of the EEC. 9 If the parent management is located
58 23 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. C 297) 5 (1980).
59 This development would certainly increase the attempts of trade unions to negotiate
through international trade union organizations with multinational companies. See, e.g., Tyler,
International Solidarity on Trial, Financial Times No. 28, Jan. 21, 1981, at 13.
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outside of the EEC, ie., in the United States of America, and does not
ensure the presence in the Community of at least one person able to
fulfill the requirements of this proposed directive, the management of
the largest subsidiary within the EEC is held responsible for fulfilling
these obligations.
Even though Article 15 contains secrecy requirements it seems
quite unrealistic to imagine employers seeking to impose sanctions for
breaches of the obligation to maintain secrecy especially in view of the
fact that secret information has been passed on to a large number of
representatives in various countries. The draft also does not consider
that companies with shares quoted on a stock exchange have to disclose
publicly the same information to the stock exchange and the sharehold-
ers. These requirements place these companies at an immediate com-
petitive disadvantage.
The Commission acted on the proposal despite the fact that
UNICE (Union des Industries de la Communautb Europbenne), the rep-
resentative of the European industry argued strongly against the draft.
It was pointed out that employers have assisted in establishing the
OECD Guidelines for Multinationals and the ILO Tripartite Declara-
tion of Principles which represent a large measure of consensus and
enjoy employer support. The success of those programs confirms that
industrial relations should be handled within the national context of
each country and that national legislation and local practice on these
matters have been proved adequate. Therefore, UNICE argued that no
case has been made for the introduction of the proposed Community
machinery.
One might argue that the proposal has certain discriminatory as-
pects because it does not affect single unit companies. Parent multina-
tional companies located in non-Member States are excluded because
the subsidiary with the greatest number of employees shall be responsi-
ble for the information and consultation with employees, even though
it cannot be assumed that the subsidiary has at its disposal the neces-
sary information. Thus, while the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Dec-
laration are based on the principle of non-discrimination against
multinational enterprises this proposed directive has the opposite
tendency.
In most EEC countries, there is no obligation for employers to
supply such extensive information at such frequent intervals to employ-
ees' representatives. Because of the amount of information involved,
the frequency with which it would have to be given, and the translation
which has to be provided to make this information accessible to local
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employees' representatives, enterprises coming under this regulation
will have to create large administrative bodies to comply with these
requirements. Especially for small and medium-size companies, com-
pliance, including establishment of the necessary translation machin-
ery, may be impossible.
The intervals at which information must be shared and the re-
quirement of consultation of employees' representatives before impor-
tant decisions can be taken, make the corporate decision-making
process cumbersome and inflexible. Thus, decisions which are neces-
sary for the effectiveness and sometimes even for the survival of the
company can be unnecessarily delayed. In its comments UNICE accu-
rately pointed out that at a time of serious economic difficulties these
rigid procedural requirements can only further inhibit potential
investments.60
It is difficult to determine whether this proposal of the Commis-
sion is likely to be adopted by the Council. The representatives of
some Member States have already indicated that the subject has great
political implication. Existing national co-determination legislation is
based on the cooperation principle. Some Member States have a pref-
erence for confrontation. It is, therefore, difficult to reconcile these op-
posing philosophies by legislative action. Apparently, the Commission
has recognized that it will not be easy to obtain council approval for the
draft directive. Replying to an inquiry of a member of the European
Parliament, the Commission admitted that the problems dealt with
have many aspects and that some of these aspects need further clarifi-
cation. Further contacts, not only with the European Parliament and
the Economic and Social Committee, but also UNICE and ETUC (Eu-
ropean Trade Union Confederation) will be necessary before the pro-
posal can advance.61
CONCLUSION
The activities of the Commission show that the Common Market
authorities favor legislation to harmonize industrial relations in the
Member States. The Commission is of the opinion that the problem of
social justice "involves progress towards participation by both sides of
60 Newspaper comments underlined these consequences. See, eg., Diese lnformationspflicht
geht 2u weit, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 231, Oct. 4, 1980, at 13; Why You may have to
bare your Soul to the Workers, Financial Times, Oct. 10, 1980, at 27; Ein neues Mitbestimmungs-
kapitel in der EG?, Neue Ztrcher Zeitung, Nov. 11, 1980.
61 23 0J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 345) 7 (1980).
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industry in the decision-making process."62
But the Treaty of Rome does not give the Community the legal
basis to introduce employees' participation because neither co-determi-
nation nor employees' participation is mentioned in the Treaty estab-
lishing the EEC. Therefore, the Commission bases its attempts to
legislate in this field on the harmonization clause for company law in
order to further its social policy objectives.63 Since practically all conti-
nental Member States have co-determination legislation as part of their
company laws, it is only logical to use these harmonization clauses.
Different legal standards requiring harmonization have developed
within the Community in this field.
The Commission can also justify its activities in this area with the
Declaration of the Heads of States and Governments of the Member
States after the first summit conference of the enlarged Community.
This Declaration states that part of the Community's social policy pro-
gram is to "secure the collaboration of workers in the function of un-
dertakings."'  The legislative attempts of the EEC have demonstrated
the close interrelation between company law and labor law. In addi-
tion, workers' participation has become part of the company legislation
of the EEC Member States. The efforts of the EEC to create a Euro-
pean labor relations legislation, however, cannot neglect the legal situa-
tion which the Treaty of Rome has created. Therefore, European labor
relations legislation can only gradually develop as part of the Member
State company laws.
62 Preliminary Guidelines for a Community Social Policy Program, 4 BULL. EUR. COMM.,
Supp. 2/71, at 48 (1971).
63 See Constas, The Developing European Community Law of Worker Paricivation in Manage-
ment, 11 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 93 (1978).
64 5 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 10) 9, 19 (1972).
